Rationality, Progressivism and the Market

The market and progressivism pose two alternative approaches to rationality. Progressives argue that social deliberation can be purposeful and that incentives that might distort rationality in deliberative decision making, such as special interest group incentives to lobby for political benefits, do not distort deliberative processes sufficiently to outweigh the benefits from deliberation. Market theorists argue that rationality depends on information appropriate to a given time and place that cannot be communicated or discerned by a deliberative body, and less so by society at large. Economic actors have specialized knowledge such as price and technological knowledge that is difficult to communicate and far too complex to be known by outsiders. This knowledge is not the knowledge of general experts, economists or the like but rather of people who understand narrow production and market demand problems because the information required is very specific. For instance, do the people of Oshkosh like a different kind of Italian food from the people of Rochester or of Madison? Do bagel consumers in Manhattan have a different taste from those in Queens, Brooklyn or Wisconsin? This kind of information can be learned through trial and error.

The organizational life cycle and organizational learning would be critical to the second kind of information but not the first. In order to survive, organizations would need to obtain and utilize the second form of information, and the incentive to do so would be the threat of organizational death. In contrast, organizations need not learn if knowledge is deliberative. All that would be required were knowledge deliberative in nature would be the hiring of outside experts to maintain or improve institutions.

This has been the claim of Progressives and New Deal social democrats who have instituted an increasing degree of government intervention. Knowledge is general in nature and so requires the help of experts trained in general theory.

There should be empirical tests available as to which approach to rationality works better. Where there are more bankruptcies, over a 40 year period do economies do better or worse? If they do better, then there would be some support for the market-based model of rationality. If they do worse over the long term, then the social democratic-progressive model would be better supported. Likewise, the possibility of organizational birth would be associated with the market-based model of rationality. Where there are more organizational births, one would expect to see greater economic vitality according to the market-based model. Deliberative processes would tend to lead to stability, hence organizational learning, death and volatility would be associated with long run economic vitality under the market-based model. But more gradual change, which would be limited by economic and scientific theory, would be associated with success under the social democratic-progressive model. Volatility and risk associated with responsiveness to price and demand fluctuations would be associated with economic success under the market-based model but not under the social-democratic-progressive model.

Another importatn question is where do innovations occur most frequently under this continuum:

total state control--->social democracy---->limited state

Which of the three is associated with the most innovation? This can be viewed within the United States. Does innovation occur more in states with the least government intervention or the most? Did innovation occur more frequently in the nineteenth century or the twentieth century?

Organizational Learning and the Progressive Model

The natural evolution of organizational learning should over time shift the relationship between business and government from more to less. Early in their history, capitalist firms lacked the ability to think and plan strategically; to research markets; to assess competition. Over time, the professionalization of management, the development of tools and learning processes, new methods of management and new planning processes and models not only provide businesses with tools that were not available to them in the 19th century, but also are less accessible to government because the personnel are not available. In David Ames Wells's time, Wells did not believe that firms could strategically plan investment; could perform market research; could persuade workers to purchase consumer goods; or could assess the long run profitability of a plant or business unit. By the 1960s, John Kenneth Galbraith overstating the case argued that firms plan and manage demand. Clearly the role of the state must change in response to the evolution of managerial knowledge. But the state's role can change only if it develops sophistication about the same processes that the firms learn about. But of course such learning is beyond the budget, the ability and the organizational flexibility of government agencies. Hence, the role of government will quickly become outdated.

The problem facing government is not just a matter of organizational learning. It is a matter of being able to anticipate the insights, deviations and failures of ever-evolving organizations. Such learning is so far beyond the ability of government, that government will inevitably prove to be disruptive to firms' learning processes.

An example is the case of Enron. Enron's failure was in large part due to its accounting emphasis on mark to market accounting. But mark to market accounting was the very policy that the SEC approved in response to Jeff Skilling's application. Another example is the California degregulation of the power market. The state adopted a regulatory system that facilitated Enron's and other power firms' manipulation of the power grid that caused massive power outages.

The results of the relationship between a state which aims to guide organizations that learn at a faster rate than the state does is one of four things. One, the state becomes irrelevant and adopts a de facto laissez faire approach. Two, the state enforces its prerogatives to control or influence industry and limits organizational learning and economic progress. Three the state attempts to ritually mimic firms' organizational learning and its supposed role of providing support to industry, squandering resources while in fact adopting a laissez faire approach. Four, the state becomes captive or subject to the influence of the industry and competing interest groups, resulting in policies that reflect political power and economic resources rather than rationality.

Government has adopted all three approaches. In human resource regulation such as OSHA and ERISA, the federal government has adopted costly regulation that has done little to improve safety or security, reducing economic opportunity. With respect to education, education schools continue to advocate progressive education approaches that reduce educational outcomes. In finance, the state has gradually backed off various regulations but continues to maintain regulation that makes it difficult for entrepreneurial financial firms to compete. In most fields the fourth likelihood has occurred. The brokerage of special interests has become a key characteristic of the American economy.