My following Op Ed appeared on page nine of the New York Sun of November 28 and is copied here courtesy of the New York Sun.
November 28, 2005 Edition > Section: Opinion > Printer-Friendly Version
Paris on the Hudson
BY MITCHELL LANGBERT
November 28, 2005
URL: http://www.nysun.com/article/23606
When considering the recent rioting in France, it is more important to remember that the rioters were poor than that they were Muslim - it was a case of economic, and not merely religious, strife. As such the episode should give New Yorkers pause. Just as the world witnessed a collision of two Frances, one of mostly ethnically French "insiders" and another of more diverse "outsiders," New York has increasingly become a city divided along class lines, with the lower stratum dominated by African Americans, Hispanics, and a perennially emigrating white working class. Is the lack of opportunity for the poor of both Paris and New York a coincidence?
Arguably not. Rather, it is in both cities a function of dirigisme, government intervention and control in the name of social cohesion and welfare. However wonderful it might sound in theory, in practice it is all too clear that "social cohesion" and "welfare" ends up excluding the poor.
In the post-World War II era, government played a large role in France's economic development. The emphasis was on creating a technocratic elite based on merit and a high degree of government influence on the economy. In the early 1980s, the socialist prime minister, Francois Mitterand, first aimed to intensify dirigisme, but because of the problems that nationalization created he reversed course and liberalized the economy. However, the liberalization did not do away with labor regulation. A 35-hour week was enforced and restrictions on firing that make hiring expensive were retained.
Like France, New York has a history of dirigisme. In the 1920s, Al Smith pushed for reforms that later became the basis for the New Deal. In reducing the influence of the patronage system of Tammany Hall, Fiorello La Guardia encouraged a meritocratic approach to hiring. The state's intervention in the economy intensified in the 1940s and 1950s with urban renewal and public housing laws that rebuilt the city's infrastructure. Due to this interventionist history, New York's economic philosophy today is closer to that of Paris than to that of Phoenix. New York's taxes are among the highest in the United States. Its rent control laws raise the rents for newcomers including the young and recent immigrants, creating homelessness. Just as French elites fear American culture, so the New York City Council passed a health insurance regulation in October targeting Wal-Mart and other big-box stores, cultural icons that are popular almost everywhere else in the country.
Regulation imposes costs on employers that make them less likely to hire. At 10%, French unemployment is higher than New York's, and among France's Islamic and African minorities unemployment levels are higher still. Tens of thousands of young people in France have given up looking for a job, and the unemployment rate for those under 25 is 25%.In New York, the unemployment rate is about 5.7% but, as in France, among teens it is 23% and for African Americans it is 10.6%. According to the Community Service Society, in New York in 2004 the black employment rate was 60.7% while for whites it was 76.6%.
In both Paris and New York, heavy regulation makes jobs scarce for those with the least power. In both cities a veneer of politically correct diversity rhetoric cloaks economic policies that benefit the median citizen such as middle class public employees while squeezing those at the margins, specifically marginal racial minorities.
Perversely, increasing labor costs through regulation creates incentives for employers to be more selective in hiring, which can mean indulging discriminatory preferences. Since regulation makes firing costly, it reduces employers' willingness to take risks on ambitious employees who lack conventional qualifications but may be willing to work longer and harder. For ambitious workers from underprivileged backgrounds, the way around discrimination often is competition through the acquisition of skills, but regulation limits the possibility of their acquiring skills by raising the cost to employers of hiring employees from diverse backgrounds that do not fit employers' stereotypes. Those who gain admission to the most prestigious schools and can afford the tuition, and those whose parents have trained them to be most articulate and socially adept, have an enhanced advantage under dirigisme. Those whose ability is harder to discern because it has not been as carefully cultivated and those who are most eager to work hard to succeed despite disadvantages are the ones likely to suffer most from marginalization.
In Paris the 35-hour workweek serves to reinforce the privileges of capital by preventing poor, would-be parvenus from working extra hours to compensate for their poverty. In New York, the state and city saddle employers with high taxes while the schools teach neither basic skills (reading, writing, and math) nor self-discipline. Instead, the students are taught to have self-esteem. The result is that the higher-end firms that can remain in New York are decreasingly likely to hire New Yorkers.
The French regularly denounce racism in the United States. Yet, when it comes to hiring, they are strikingly discriminatory. In New York, the diversity rhetoric is coupled with the eviction of Wal-Mart and the managed decay of the educational system, policies that cripple the poor while subsidizing special labor interests.
In both Paris and New York, large, established firms find it easy to comply with complicated regulations while small entrepreneurial firms find it difficult. Middle- to upper-income consumers don't mind spending more at a department store, while lower-income consumers are in need of the price reduction Wal-Mart offers. Most importantly, those who have not been able to graduate have a greater need for work experience in modest-paying jobs with longer hours and will benefit most from the experience that marginal jobs offer. But such jobs are driven out by dirigisme in Paris and New York.
Perhaps the biggest difference between France and New York is that dirigisme is a policy that influences all of France, while New York's state intervention does not cross the Hudson. Since the days of Horace Greeley, New Yorkers have tended to emigrate westward. In recent decades, the reason has been New York's war against the poor. The working-class youngsters in the French suburbs do not have a larger nation with a free market philosophy to which they can emigrate to escape the assault of dirigisme. As a result, the young French increasingly emigrate to London, much as New Yorkers have increasingly emigrated to Texas, California, and Colorado. Policies that claim to be communitarian are precisely those that are decimating communities in Paris and New York.
Mr. Langbert is an associate professor of business and economics at Brooklyn College.
Wednesday, May 23, 2007
The Need for Counter-4GW
In 2003, William S. Lind argued that the US invasion of Iraq would face debilitating trouble from insurgency and terrorism, also known as fourth generation warfare, or 4GW. Col. Thomas Hammes also ably discusses this concept in his book The Sling and the Stone. Lind's view of second generation warfare is that it involves use of artillery followed by occupation of troops, or "putting steel on target." Third generation warfare follows the German Blitzkrieg in focusing on the situation and on surprise. Fourth generation war, though, involves fighting non-state opponents. It involves a conflict of belief systems or cultures. In it, "invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army." "At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation War on their soil."
Lind and Hammes are implicitly suggesting that just as generations one and two of warfare reflected industrialization, the telegraph and railroad, while the third generation reflected the advent of the automobile, truck and radio, the fourth generation is associated with the mass media and information technology. War becomes increasingly a matter of propaganda, mass information and attitudes rather than mere organized violence or, as Clausewitz defined it (On War, chapter 1) "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." With a Ph.D. in labor relations, I would term 4GW the triumph of Saul Alinsky. The methods that Alinsky discusses in his book Rules for Radicals are very, very similar to the concepts of 4GW.
The transition from the second to the fourth generation of warfare parallels how management has changed from the days of the Ford assembly line to the days of self-directed teams, computer aided design, flexible management, just-in-time inventory systems and modular organizations. Rather than use artillery and then occupy an opponent's terrain, an entirely different set of issues becomes paramount: integration into the enemy's community; the interpersonal conduct of forces in the community after battle; cultural intelligence; reliance on intelligent special operations operatives; and emphasis on public relations. Lind argues that "(o)ne key to success in 4GW may be 'losing to win.'" Maintenance of state systems, which we failed to do in Iraq is also important, as is the observation that "many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war."
If Lind, Hammes and other advocates of 4GW are right, it seems to me that the response will not come from the state, which is bound by special interest groups. Rather, it needs to come from private individuals who respond to the terrorists' 4GW with counter-4GW. This would involve standing up to the media and our leaders who are motivated by personal interest in responding to special interest group pressure rather than the national welfare.
The chief source of informaton is of course the media. A second is academia. If insurgents and terrorists have used information to their advantage, then those who wish to respond need to work on exposing the rot in these institutions.
Earlier I watched The New York Times's Thomas Friedman on CBS News. Friedman was being interviewed as an expert on Iraqi policy. He made a few imbecilic points, each of which contradicted the other but had only one theme: attack President Bush. On the one hand, he argued that if the War in Iraq is like World War II, we have too few troops and we shouldn't have low taxes. On the other, he argued that America used to be in the business of exporting hope, but now it is in the business of exporting fear. I mean, which is it? Increase the number of troops, bring them home or what? The fact is that Friedman was unable to articulate a coherent alternative strategy for Iraq because he hasn't given it a moment's thought. Is Friedman the sort of person who should be viewed as an expert to be interviewed on national television? Or is he and the Times a joke?
It has become increasingly urgent for citizens to educate themselves about military strategy through books because the mainstream media, including some of my favorite sources like the Economist have not provided the public with a coherent framework for thinking about current events. Yet, Lind and Hammes provide one that is readily available.
Lind and Hammes are implicitly suggesting that just as generations one and two of warfare reflected industrialization, the telegraph and railroad, while the third generation reflected the advent of the automobile, truck and radio, the fourth generation is associated with the mass media and information technology. War becomes increasingly a matter of propaganda, mass information and attitudes rather than mere organized violence or, as Clausewitz defined it (On War, chapter 1) "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." With a Ph.D. in labor relations, I would term 4GW the triumph of Saul Alinsky. The methods that Alinsky discusses in his book Rules for Radicals are very, very similar to the concepts of 4GW.
The transition from the second to the fourth generation of warfare parallels how management has changed from the days of the Ford assembly line to the days of self-directed teams, computer aided design, flexible management, just-in-time inventory systems and modular organizations. Rather than use artillery and then occupy an opponent's terrain, an entirely different set of issues becomes paramount: integration into the enemy's community; the interpersonal conduct of forces in the community after battle; cultural intelligence; reliance on intelligent special operations operatives; and emphasis on public relations. Lind argues that "(o)ne key to success in 4GW may be 'losing to win.'" Maintenance of state systems, which we failed to do in Iraq is also important, as is the observation that "many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war."
If Lind, Hammes and other advocates of 4GW are right, it seems to me that the response will not come from the state, which is bound by special interest groups. Rather, it needs to come from private individuals who respond to the terrorists' 4GW with counter-4GW. This would involve standing up to the media and our leaders who are motivated by personal interest in responding to special interest group pressure rather than the national welfare.
The chief source of informaton is of course the media. A second is academia. If insurgents and terrorists have used information to their advantage, then those who wish to respond need to work on exposing the rot in these institutions.
Earlier I watched The New York Times's Thomas Friedman on CBS News. Friedman was being interviewed as an expert on Iraqi policy. He made a few imbecilic points, each of which contradicted the other but had only one theme: attack President Bush. On the one hand, he argued that if the War in Iraq is like World War II, we have too few troops and we shouldn't have low taxes. On the other, he argued that America used to be in the business of exporting hope, but now it is in the business of exporting fear. I mean, which is it? Increase the number of troops, bring them home or what? The fact is that Friedman was unable to articulate a coherent alternative strategy for Iraq because he hasn't given it a moment's thought. Is Friedman the sort of person who should be viewed as an expert to be interviewed on national television? Or is he and the Times a joke?
It has become increasingly urgent for citizens to educate themselves about military strategy through books because the mainstream media, including some of my favorite sources like the Economist have not provided the public with a coherent framework for thinking about current events. Yet, Lind and Hammes provide one that is readily available.
Iraq and the Terror Threat
The New York Times (paid access) writes that a new intelligence report indicates that the terror threat from the Islamic world has grown in response to the Iraqi War, Guantanimo Bay and Abu Graib. The Times also indicates that prior to the invasion of Iraq in 2003 there was a similar report which argued that the invasion might increase support for political Islam and terrorism.
I don't have the polling facts, but let's say that popular dislike of the United States among Germans increased in Germany after Germany declared war against the US in 1941. Should we not have declared war on Japan in order to avoid the decline in popularity in Germany? The New York Times appears to think so.
The problem with the Times's reporting in this article ("Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terror Threat", Mark Mazzetti, September 24, 2006) and in general is its imbalance. In this article Mark Mazzetti examines only Type I but not Type II error. Type I error is the probability that the null hypothesis is true given a finding that it is false. Type II error is the probability that the alternative hypothesis is true, given a finding that the null hypothesis is true.
In plain English, you need to be aware of and control for the effect on terrorism of both invading and not invading. While it may be that the risk of terrorism has increased following the invasion of Iraq because of increased Islamic support for terrorism, it may also be that if we did not invade Iraq the risk of terrorism would have increased even more because terrorists would have perceived us as weaklings. Popular opinion is not the only necessary condition for terrorist threats. The ability and willingness to engage in terrorism are also important. It is entirely possible that these have been deterred while popular dislike for the US has increased. Better a hobbled terrorist infrastructure with hatred of us than a robust terrorist infrastructure with the entire world in love with us.
For example, we did not invade Iraq after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and that was followed by the attack on the Cole in 2000. We did not invade Iraq after the bombing of the Cole in 2000, and that was followed by September 11, 2001. It is clear that the trend toward shorter time intervals between major terrorist attacks that evolved during the Clinton administration has been reversed. It was seven years between the World Trade Center I and the Cole. It was less than two years between the Cole and 9/11, but it has been five years since a major attack against the US outside of Iraq.
The intelligence report may be completely correct, but that might speak well for President Bush. Would the Times have liked to see the German people have more positive feelings about the US in 1945 than in 1935?
Ommission as per Charles Ellison of the University of Denver
Charles Ellison of the Center for African-American Policy of the University of Denver points out three additional major terror strikes during the Clinton years, namely Nairobi Kenya in 1998 and the car bomb explosion at the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam. In addition, there was the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Ellison writes:
>You may have inadvertently omitted the U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya in 1998 that killed 257 people and the car bomb explosion at the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These two explosions also resulted in he wounding of 4,000 people. In addition, we shouldn't forget the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
It was the 1998 Kenya bombing that attracted serious international attention to bin Laden for the first time and put him on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted List.
Regards,
Charles D. Ellison
Senior Editor/Producer
Blackpolicy.org
Center for African American Policy
University of Denver
I don't have the polling facts, but let's say that popular dislike of the United States among Germans increased in Germany after Germany declared war against the US in 1941. Should we not have declared war on Japan in order to avoid the decline in popularity in Germany? The New York Times appears to think so.
The problem with the Times's reporting in this article ("Spy Agencies Say Iraq War Worsens Terror Threat", Mark Mazzetti, September 24, 2006) and in general is its imbalance. In this article Mark Mazzetti examines only Type I but not Type II error. Type I error is the probability that the null hypothesis is true given a finding that it is false. Type II error is the probability that the alternative hypothesis is true, given a finding that the null hypothesis is true.
In plain English, you need to be aware of and control for the effect on terrorism of both invading and not invading. While it may be that the risk of terrorism has increased following the invasion of Iraq because of increased Islamic support for terrorism, it may also be that if we did not invade Iraq the risk of terrorism would have increased even more because terrorists would have perceived us as weaklings. Popular opinion is not the only necessary condition for terrorist threats. The ability and willingness to engage in terrorism are also important. It is entirely possible that these have been deterred while popular dislike for the US has increased. Better a hobbled terrorist infrastructure with hatred of us than a robust terrorist infrastructure with the entire world in love with us.
For example, we did not invade Iraq after the first World Trade Center bombing in 1993, and that was followed by the attack on the Cole in 2000. We did not invade Iraq after the bombing of the Cole in 2000, and that was followed by September 11, 2001. It is clear that the trend toward shorter time intervals between major terrorist attacks that evolved during the Clinton administration has been reversed. It was seven years between the World Trade Center I and the Cole. It was less than two years between the Cole and 9/11, but it has been five years since a major attack against the US outside of Iraq.
The intelligence report may be completely correct, but that might speak well for President Bush. Would the Times have liked to see the German people have more positive feelings about the US in 1945 than in 1935?
Ommission as per Charles Ellison of the University of Denver
Charles Ellison of the Center for African-American Policy of the University of Denver points out three additional major terror strikes during the Clinton years, namely Nairobi Kenya in 1998 and the car bomb explosion at the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam. In addition, there was the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
Mr. Ellison writes:
>You may have inadvertently omitted the U.S. Embassy bombing in Nairobi, Kenya in 1998 that killed 257 people and the car bomb explosion at the United States embassy in Dar es Salaam, Tanzania. These two explosions also resulted in he wounding of 4,000 people. In addition, we shouldn't forget the 1996 Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia.
It was the 1998 Kenya bombing that attracted serious international attention to bin Laden for the first time and put him on the FBI's 10 Most Wanted List.
Regards,
Charles D. Ellison
Senior Editor/Producer
Blackpolicy.org
Center for African American Policy
University of Denver
Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies
The model of 4th generation warfare as enunciated by Thomas Hammes and others is rooted in the insurgencies that Mao led in China and Ho Chi Min led in Vietnam. As Hammes depicts it, such insurgencies depend on the insurgents' willingness to withdraw and attack; to govern and develop loyalty in territory which they control; and to refrain from orthodox warfare until they control sufficient territory. Hammes does not dissect the interaction of ideology with 4th generation warfare tactics. However, the insurgencies he describes are mostly communist or leftist and prevailed in the age of radio and television. Such insurgencies were not Islamic, and pre-existed technological innovations that have occurred since the days of the Vietnam War, namely, the internet and cellular phones.
It is obvious that Islam plays an important role in the Middle East, and the Iraqi War cannot be understood outside of Sunni-Shia relations and Islamic value systems. Sunni-Shia relations are only beginnning to be understood in the popular American mind, notably via Vali Nasr's Shia Revival.
New technology, Islamic values and relations radically change the implications of Hammes's strategic model. In some ways, Islamic culture makes fifth generation conflict more like pre-modern warfare. Categories such as the Islamic ummah and historical beliefs about the role of religion in government need to be understood and utilized. Such understanding is not only a matter of public relations and propaganda, but also of management of conflict within target populations. The notion of an insurgency that has national parameters is not applicable to the Middle East. Also, evaluations about attitudes and loyalties need to be made in the appropriate historical context. It is as naive to think that fighting a terrorist enemy is like fighting the Vietnamese as it is to think that fighting the Vietnamese would be like fighting German General Eric Ludendorff in 1918. In particular, the interactivity of Islamic belief with military action means that a more total approach to war might be necessary than it would be with insurgencies that are built on shorter term loyalties to the personalities of specific leaders. 4GW may be passe.
It is obvious that Islam plays an important role in the Middle East, and the Iraqi War cannot be understood outside of Sunni-Shia relations and Islamic value systems. Sunni-Shia relations are only beginnning to be understood in the popular American mind, notably via Vali Nasr's Shia Revival.
New technology, Islamic values and relations radically change the implications of Hammes's strategic model. In some ways, Islamic culture makes fifth generation conflict more like pre-modern warfare. Categories such as the Islamic ummah and historical beliefs about the role of religion in government need to be understood and utilized. Such understanding is not only a matter of public relations and propaganda, but also of management of conflict within target populations. The notion of an insurgency that has national parameters is not applicable to the Middle East. Also, evaluations about attitudes and loyalties need to be made in the appropriate historical context. It is as naive to think that fighting a terrorist enemy is like fighting the Vietnamese as it is to think that fighting the Vietnamese would be like fighting German General Eric Ludendorff in 1918. In particular, the interactivity of Islamic belief with military action means that a more total approach to war might be necessary than it would be with insurgencies that are built on shorter term loyalties to the personalities of specific leaders. 4GW may be passe.
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