I sent Brooklyn College's President Karen Gould a response to her letter today concerning the appearance at Brooklyn College of Omar Barghouti, the advocate of sanctions against Israeli academics:
President Gould, as a practical matter I support your decision to allow Barghouti's appearance, but some of the faculty here at Brooklyn have substituted political advocacy for academics and so have a biased, unfair, and inaccurate definition of academic freedom. I urge you to address the comparison between Evan Goldwyn in 2005 and Omar Barghouti in 2013 in a public statement. In 2005 the now-defunct New York Sun ran an article on Goldwyn. The same academics now claiming that Barghouti, a master's degree student, deserves academic freedom then said that Goldwyn, also a student, was not entitled to academic freedom because he was a student. See: http://www.nysun.com/new-york/disposition-emerges-as-issue-at-brooklyn-college/14604/ .
In the Goldwyn case Professor Parmar attempted to throw Goldwyn out of school because he disagreed with her claim that English is the language of white oppressors. Several professors now arguing for Barghouti's academic freedom then argued that students are not entitled to academic freedom. Would you please comment publicly on the different response to the two cases? Goldwyn was saved only by the publicity KC Johnson brought, not because, since the 1990s or earlier, the school has had a history of supporting academic freedom--except for left-wingers. Barghouti has an international reputation as a political propagandist or activist, not as an academic. Section 501 (c) (3) explicitly rejects political propaganda as part of an educational institution's mission, and in taking a tax exemption Brooklyn College committed to that position. Are you reversing that position now, or are you claiming that Barghouti is an academic?
Also, the claim that there is academic freedom in a political science department with 100% left-wingers and 0% conservatives, libertarians, or other alternative viewpoints, with any alternative views being suppressed or excluded, is a joke. The same is true of the economics department, which has excluded, for example, the Austrian economics viewpoint.
As well, political propaganda is not academic or educational, as Section 501 (c) (3) clearly states. If the college, as apparently the political science department does, sees its role as propaganda rather than education (a position which former provost Roberta Matthews advocated--but not for tax purposes, concerning which she was willing to lie--when she said that all teaching is political), I would appreciate your explicit clarification of why a talk that advocates sanctions against Israeli academics is in any sense "academic" or "educational" as required by section 501(c)(3) for tax exemption purposes.
-----Original Message-----
From: Karen L. Gould, President [mailto:bcpresident@brooklyn.cuny.edu]
Sent: Mon 2/4/2013 10:50 AM
To: Staff E-Mail
Subject: A steadfast commitment to academic freedom with a commitment to ongoing dialogue and debate
Dear students, faculty, and staff,
During the past week, due to an upcoming event about the BDS movement, our campus has been wrestling with issues of tremendous importance to our college and our community. There are passionate views on many sides. While we appreciate the many voices of support for our stand on academic freedom, we cannot disregard the concerns raised by some of our students and alumni.
First, however, let me be clear: Our commitment to the principles of academic freedom remains steadfast. Students and faculty, including academic departments, programs, and centers, have the right to invite speakers, engage in discussion, and present ideas to further educational discussion and debate. The mere invitation to speak does not indicate an endorsement of any particular point of view, and there is no obligation, as some have suggested, to present multiple perspectives at any one event. In this case, the department's co-sponsorship of the event is an invitation to participate; it does not indicate an endorsement of the speakers' positions. Providing an open forum to discuss important topics, even those many find highly objectionable, is a centuries-old practice on university campuses around the country. Indeed, this spirit of inquiry and critical debate is a hallmark of the American education system.
At the same time, it is essential that Brooklyn College remain an engaged and civil learning environment where all views may be expressed without fear of intimidation or reprisal. As I stated last week, we encourage debate, discussion, and more debate. Students and faculty should explore these and other issues from multiple viewpoints and in a variety of forums so that no single perspective serves as the only basis for consideration. Contrary to some reports, the Department of Political Science fully agrees and has reaffirmed its longstanding policy to give equal consideration to co-sponsoring speakers who represent any and all points of view.
Over the next two months, with the support of the Wolfe Institute for the Humanities and other campus units and community groups, we will provide multiple opportunities for discussion about the topics and related subject matter at the heart of this controversy. In addition to Thursday evening's event, at which I encourage those with opposing views to participate in the discussion and ask tough questions, other forums will present alternative perspectives for consideration. The college welcomes participation from any groups on our campus that may wish to help broaden the dialogue. At each of these events, please keep in mind that students, faculty, staff, and guests are expected to treat one another with respect at all times, even when they strongly disagree.
Finally, to those who have voiced concern that our decision to uphold the rights of our students and faculty signals an endorsement of the speakers' views, I say again that nothing could be further from the truth. Moreover, I assure you that our college does not endorse the BDS movement nor support its call for boycott, divestment, and sanctions against Israel. As the official host of the CUNY center for study abroad in Israel, our college has a proud history of engagement with Israel and Israeli universities. In fact, over the past two years we have renewed our efforts to reconnect with existing institutional partners and to develop new relationships as well for faculty and student exchanges with Israeli institutions. We deeply value our Israeli partners and would not endorse any action that would imperil the State of Israel or its citizens, many of whom are family members and friends of our students, faculty, staff, alumni, and neighbors.
As one of the most diverse colleges in the country, it is particularly important that Brooklyn College foster an inclusive environment where all may voice their points of view across the full spectrum of social, political, and cultural issues of our time. As Supreme Court Justice Louis Brandeis wisely stated nearly a century ago, when one finds another's speech offensive, "...the remedy to be applied is more speech, not enforced silence." Together, we must work to ensure that on our campus more and more speech continues to occur so that our students can be broadened in their knowledge, challenged in their thinking, and encouraged to bring their own analysis and values to bear on a wide range of topics of local, national, and global interest.
Sincerely,
Karen L. Gould
President
Showing posts with label Evan Goldwyn. Show all posts
Showing posts with label Evan Goldwyn. Show all posts
Monday, February 4, 2013
Thursday, December 6, 2007
Herbert Croly and The Ideological Origins of The Social Justice Disposition Concept
Herbert Croly (1869-1930) was one of the chief Progressive-liberal authors. He was founder in 1914 of the New Republic magazine, and his 1909 book Promise of American Life is a bulwark of Progressivism. I am reading his later (1914) Progressive Democracy and noticed his emphasis on the concept of social justice. Arguably, the concept of social justice dispositions is rooted in Progressive Democracy. In the book, Croly's use of the term social justice is unabashedly ideological. In fact, Croly's aim is to refute nineteenth century ideological individualism to replace it with with an ideology of unlimited government and democratic power. Croly believed that the American population was better educated to participate in democracy in 1914 than in 1814 and that the legal constraints on the popular will that characterized the early stage of American democracy were no longer needed. Given subsequent European history, specifically Hitler and Stalin, the notion of unlimited government with democratic rationale sounds reactionary or atavistic (if argued by today's "new Progresives" such as Peter Levine) rather than progressive. In any case, Croly introduces the concept of social justice and a construct of the interplay between individual integrity and social welfare that is similar to the educationist notion of social justice disposition as part of his ideological argument. I would go so far as to argue that the concept of social justice disposition is explicitly part of Croly's ideological construction. Even if my strong claim is not true, it is clear that the concept of social justice disposition is rooted in liberal-Progressive ideology, not psychology.
About two years ago there was a controversy at Brooklyn College concerning Professor Priyar Parmar and her student Evan Goldwyn. Professor Parmar was interested in disciplining Goldwyn because he lacked what she considered to be social justice dispositions. As well, Steven Head was dismissed from the San Jose State University education school for disagreeing with a professor concerning a political question. As at Brooklyn College, SJSU's "Progressive" educators claimed that Head lacked a social justice disposition.
The far-fetched claim that social justice dispositions exist and that they are measurable was attributable in part to the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), which dropped the use of social justice dispositions in its accreditation standards last year. However, universities can still apply standards involving social justice dispositions without NCATE's explicit encouragement. Doing so, however, raises legal First Amendment issues involving the 1943 case of West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette . According to that case, university programs are not permitted to require tests of belief. Thus, if social justice disposition is an ideological construct, universities are, if they mandate social justice dispositional requirements, violating legal standards. Thus, if social justice disposition is a purely ideological construct, for NCATE to properly address the issue of social justice dispositions, and to establish accreditation standards that accord with social justice, i.e., that do not violate the law, it needs to explicitly prohibit the use of social justice as an assessment criteria in any university that it accredits.
Social justice disposition advocates, such as Vernon C. Polite, claim that social justice is a neutral term and not ideological. However, a close reading of Croly suggests that the term social justice played a significant role in the Progressive-liberal framework. There is no pretense in Croly's book that it offers anything but an ideology or political belief system, a counter-argument to the laissez faire views of nineteenth century conservatives(pp. 148-9):
"The idea of individual justice is being supplemented by the idea of social justice. When our constitutions were written, the traditions of English law, the contemporary political philosophy and the economic situation of the American democracy all conspired to embody in them and their interpretation an extremely individualistic conception of justice--a conception which practically confided social welfare to the free expression of individual interests and good intentions. Now the tendency is to conceive the social welfare not as an end which cannot be left to the happy harmonizing of individual interests, but as an end which must be consciously willed by society and efficiently realized. Society, that is, has become a moral ideal, not independent of the individual but supplementary to him, an ideal which must be pursued less by regulating individual excesses than by the active conscious encouragement of socializing tendencies and purposes "(my emphasis)...
"(p. 199) The individual has the best chance of giving integrity to his life in a society which is being informed by the social ideal...Although an advance towards social salvation will be accelerated by increasing individual integrity, society will never be saved as a consequence of the regeneration of individualism...The two ideals (individual and social welfare) cannot become sufficiently interdependent without retaining a large measure of independence."
The inculcation of social justice dispositions is part of Croly's ideological programme. Central to Croly's ideology is his belief that society should be consciously created through state intervention, which in turn he claims is an expression of the popular will. This is an ideological position, not a psychological model. He argues that a "social ideal" is needed for an individual to give integrity to his life. He also argues that individual integrity is necessary for the social ideal. This intersection of the social and individual is precisely the notion of disposition to which the advocates of dispositional assessment allude.
About two years ago there was a controversy at Brooklyn College concerning Professor Priyar Parmar and her student Evan Goldwyn. Professor Parmar was interested in disciplining Goldwyn because he lacked what she considered to be social justice dispositions. As well, Steven Head was dismissed from the San Jose State University education school for disagreeing with a professor concerning a political question. As at Brooklyn College, SJSU's "Progressive" educators claimed that Head lacked a social justice disposition.
The far-fetched claim that social justice dispositions exist and that they are measurable was attributable in part to the National Council for the Accreditation of Teacher Education (NCATE), which dropped the use of social justice dispositions in its accreditation standards last year. However, universities can still apply standards involving social justice dispositions without NCATE's explicit encouragement. Doing so, however, raises legal First Amendment issues involving the 1943 case of West Virginia Board of Education v Barnette . According to that case, university programs are not permitted to require tests of belief. Thus, if social justice disposition is an ideological construct, universities are, if they mandate social justice dispositional requirements, violating legal standards. Thus, if social justice disposition is a purely ideological construct, for NCATE to properly address the issue of social justice dispositions, and to establish accreditation standards that accord with social justice, i.e., that do not violate the law, it needs to explicitly prohibit the use of social justice as an assessment criteria in any university that it accredits.
Social justice disposition advocates, such as Vernon C. Polite, claim that social justice is a neutral term and not ideological. However, a close reading of Croly suggests that the term social justice played a significant role in the Progressive-liberal framework. There is no pretense in Croly's book that it offers anything but an ideology or political belief system, a counter-argument to the laissez faire views of nineteenth century conservatives(pp. 148-9):
"The idea of individual justice is being supplemented by the idea of social justice. When our constitutions were written, the traditions of English law, the contemporary political philosophy and the economic situation of the American democracy all conspired to embody in them and their interpretation an extremely individualistic conception of justice--a conception which practically confided social welfare to the free expression of individual interests and good intentions. Now the tendency is to conceive the social welfare not as an end which cannot be left to the happy harmonizing of individual interests, but as an end which must be consciously willed by society and efficiently realized. Society, that is, has become a moral ideal, not independent of the individual but supplementary to him, an ideal which must be pursued less by regulating individual excesses than by the active conscious encouragement of socializing tendencies and purposes "(my emphasis)...
"(p. 199) The individual has the best chance of giving integrity to his life in a society which is being informed by the social ideal...Although an advance towards social salvation will be accelerated by increasing individual integrity, society will never be saved as a consequence of the regeneration of individualism...The two ideals (individual and social welfare) cannot become sufficiently interdependent without retaining a large measure of independence."
The inculcation of social justice dispositions is part of Croly's ideological programme. Central to Croly's ideology is his belief that society should be consciously created through state intervention, which in turn he claims is an expression of the popular will. This is an ideological position, not a psychological model. He argues that a "social ideal" is needed for an individual to give integrity to his life. He also argues that individual integrity is necessary for the social ideal. This intersection of the social and individual is precisely the notion of disposition to which the advocates of dispositional assessment allude.
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