Hugh Hewitt blogs a NY Post article by Arthur Herman (hat tip Larwyn) that states:
>"AMERICA has won, or is about to win, the Iraq war.
"The latest proof came last month, as the Iraqi army - just a few months ago the target of scorn and abuse from Democratic politicians and journalists - forcefully reoccupied three cities that had served as key insurgency bases (Basra, Sadr City and Mosul).
"Sunnis and Shias alike applauded as their nation's army compelled insurgent militias to lay down their arms. The country's leading opposition newspaper, Azzaman, led the applause for the move into Mosul - a sign that national reconciliation in Iraq is under way and probably irreversible..."
Hewitt points out that Obama has been receiving hundreds of millions of dollars in financial support despite his eagerness to prove Herman wrong and to prove that America has lost. Obama does not express a pro-America game plan, but rather views defeat in Iraq as a way to prove America is a "nice" country so that terrorists will understand how nice the US is and stop being terrorists. Obama's and the left's position is foolish. General Petraeus has demonstrated that a fourth generation warfare strategy will work. The war will wind down soon without the left's and Obama's anti-American posturing.
Showing posts with label fourth generation warfare. Show all posts
Showing posts with label fourth generation warfare. Show all posts
Tuesday, June 10, 2008
Wednesday, May 23, 2007
The Need for Counter-4GW
In 2003, William S. Lind argued that the US invasion of Iraq would face debilitating trouble from insurgency and terrorism, also known as fourth generation warfare, or 4GW. Col. Thomas Hammes also ably discusses this concept in his book The Sling and the Stone. Lind's view of second generation warfare is that it involves use of artillery followed by occupation of troops, or "putting steel on target." Third generation warfare follows the German Blitzkrieg in focusing on the situation and on surprise. Fourth generation war, though, involves fighting non-state opponents. It involves a conflict of belief systems or cultures. In it, "invasion by immigration can be at least as dangerous as invasion by a state army." "At its core lies a universal crisis of legitimacy of the state, and that crisis means many countries will evolve Fourth Generation War on their soil."
Lind and Hammes are implicitly suggesting that just as generations one and two of warfare reflected industrialization, the telegraph and railroad, while the third generation reflected the advent of the automobile, truck and radio, the fourth generation is associated with the mass media and information technology. War becomes increasingly a matter of propaganda, mass information and attitudes rather than mere organized violence or, as Clausewitz defined it (On War, chapter 1) "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." With a Ph.D. in labor relations, I would term 4GW the triumph of Saul Alinsky. The methods that Alinsky discusses in his book Rules for Radicals are very, very similar to the concepts of 4GW.
The transition from the second to the fourth generation of warfare parallels how management has changed from the days of the Ford assembly line to the days of self-directed teams, computer aided design, flexible management, just-in-time inventory systems and modular organizations. Rather than use artillery and then occupy an opponent's terrain, an entirely different set of issues becomes paramount: integration into the enemy's community; the interpersonal conduct of forces in the community after battle; cultural intelligence; reliance on intelligent special operations operatives; and emphasis on public relations. Lind argues that "(o)ne key to success in 4GW may be 'losing to win.'" Maintenance of state systems, which we failed to do in Iraq is also important, as is the observation that "many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war."
If Lind, Hammes and other advocates of 4GW are right, it seems to me that the response will not come from the state, which is bound by special interest groups. Rather, it needs to come from private individuals who respond to the terrorists' 4GW with counter-4GW. This would involve standing up to the media and our leaders who are motivated by personal interest in responding to special interest group pressure rather than the national welfare.
The chief source of informaton is of course the media. A second is academia. If insurgents and terrorists have used information to their advantage, then those who wish to respond need to work on exposing the rot in these institutions.
Earlier I watched The New York Times's Thomas Friedman on CBS News. Friedman was being interviewed as an expert on Iraqi policy. He made a few imbecilic points, each of which contradicted the other but had only one theme: attack President Bush. On the one hand, he argued that if the War in Iraq is like World War II, we have too few troops and we shouldn't have low taxes. On the other, he argued that America used to be in the business of exporting hope, but now it is in the business of exporting fear. I mean, which is it? Increase the number of troops, bring them home or what? The fact is that Friedman was unable to articulate a coherent alternative strategy for Iraq because he hasn't given it a moment's thought. Is Friedman the sort of person who should be viewed as an expert to be interviewed on national television? Or is he and the Times a joke?
It has become increasingly urgent for citizens to educate themselves about military strategy through books because the mainstream media, including some of my favorite sources like the Economist have not provided the public with a coherent framework for thinking about current events. Yet, Lind and Hammes provide one that is readily available.
Lind and Hammes are implicitly suggesting that just as generations one and two of warfare reflected industrialization, the telegraph and railroad, while the third generation reflected the advent of the automobile, truck and radio, the fourth generation is associated with the mass media and information technology. War becomes increasingly a matter of propaganda, mass information and attitudes rather than mere organized violence or, as Clausewitz defined it (On War, chapter 1) "an act of violence intended to compel our opponent to fulfil our will." With a Ph.D. in labor relations, I would term 4GW the triumph of Saul Alinsky. The methods that Alinsky discusses in his book Rules for Radicals are very, very similar to the concepts of 4GW.
The transition from the second to the fourth generation of warfare parallels how management has changed from the days of the Ford assembly line to the days of self-directed teams, computer aided design, flexible management, just-in-time inventory systems and modular organizations. Rather than use artillery and then occupy an opponent's terrain, an entirely different set of issues becomes paramount: integration into the enemy's community; the interpersonal conduct of forces in the community after battle; cultural intelligence; reliance on intelligent special operations operatives; and emphasis on public relations. Lind argues that "(o)ne key to success in 4GW may be 'losing to win.'" Maintenance of state systems, which we failed to do in Iraq is also important, as is the observation that "many different entities, not just governments of states, will wage war."
If Lind, Hammes and other advocates of 4GW are right, it seems to me that the response will not come from the state, which is bound by special interest groups. Rather, it needs to come from private individuals who respond to the terrorists' 4GW with counter-4GW. This would involve standing up to the media and our leaders who are motivated by personal interest in responding to special interest group pressure rather than the national welfare.
The chief source of informaton is of course the media. A second is academia. If insurgents and terrorists have used information to their advantage, then those who wish to respond need to work on exposing the rot in these institutions.
Earlier I watched The New York Times's Thomas Friedman on CBS News. Friedman was being interviewed as an expert on Iraqi policy. He made a few imbecilic points, each of which contradicted the other but had only one theme: attack President Bush. On the one hand, he argued that if the War in Iraq is like World War II, we have too few troops and we shouldn't have low taxes. On the other, he argued that America used to be in the business of exporting hope, but now it is in the business of exporting fear. I mean, which is it? Increase the number of troops, bring them home or what? The fact is that Friedman was unable to articulate a coherent alternative strategy for Iraq because he hasn't given it a moment's thought. Is Friedman the sort of person who should be viewed as an expert to be interviewed on national television? Or is he and the Times a joke?
It has become increasingly urgent for citizens to educate themselves about military strategy through books because the mainstream media, including some of my favorite sources like the Economist have not provided the public with a coherent framework for thinking about current events. Yet, Lind and Hammes provide one that is readily available.
Fifth Generation Warfare: 4GW No Longer Applies
The model of 4th generation warfare as enunciated by Thomas Hammes and others is rooted in the insurgencies that Mao led in China and Ho Chi Min led in Vietnam. As Hammes depicts it, such insurgencies depend on the insurgents' willingness to withdraw and attack; to govern and develop loyalty in territory which they control; and to refrain from orthodox warfare until they control sufficient territory. Hammes does not dissect the interaction of ideology with 4th generation warfare tactics. However, the insurgencies he describes are mostly communist or leftist and prevailed in the age of radio and television. Such insurgencies were not Islamic, and pre-existed technological innovations that have occurred since the days of the Vietnam War, namely, the internet and cellular phones.
It is obvious that Islam plays an important role in the Middle East, and the Iraqi War cannot be understood outside of Sunni-Shia relations and Islamic value systems. Sunni-Shia relations are only beginnning to be understood in the popular American mind, notably via Vali Nasr's Shia Revival.
New technology, Islamic values and relations radically change the implications of Hammes's strategic model. In some ways, Islamic culture makes fifth generation conflict more like pre-modern warfare. Categories such as the Islamic ummah and historical beliefs about the role of religion in government need to be understood and utilized. Such understanding is not only a matter of public relations and propaganda, but also of management of conflict within target populations. The notion of an insurgency that has national parameters is not applicable to the Middle East. Also, evaluations about attitudes and loyalties need to be made in the appropriate historical context. It is as naive to think that fighting a terrorist enemy is like fighting the Vietnamese as it is to think that fighting the Vietnamese would be like fighting German General Eric Ludendorff in 1918. In particular, the interactivity of Islamic belief with military action means that a more total approach to war might be necessary than it would be with insurgencies that are built on shorter term loyalties to the personalities of specific leaders. 4GW may be passe.
It is obvious that Islam plays an important role in the Middle East, and the Iraqi War cannot be understood outside of Sunni-Shia relations and Islamic value systems. Sunni-Shia relations are only beginnning to be understood in the popular American mind, notably via Vali Nasr's Shia Revival.
New technology, Islamic values and relations radically change the implications of Hammes's strategic model. In some ways, Islamic culture makes fifth generation conflict more like pre-modern warfare. Categories such as the Islamic ummah and historical beliefs about the role of religion in government need to be understood and utilized. Such understanding is not only a matter of public relations and propaganda, but also of management of conflict within target populations. The notion of an insurgency that has national parameters is not applicable to the Middle East. Also, evaluations about attitudes and loyalties need to be made in the appropriate historical context. It is as naive to think that fighting a terrorist enemy is like fighting the Vietnamese as it is to think that fighting the Vietnamese would be like fighting German General Eric Ludendorff in 1918. In particular, the interactivity of Islamic belief with military action means that a more total approach to war might be necessary than it would be with insurgencies that are built on shorter term loyalties to the personalities of specific leaders. 4GW may be passe.
Phil Beckman on Fifth Generation Warfare
Phil Beckman writes:
>"In a recent post Mitchell mentions that 4GW may be passe and that many of the things that Hammes writes about aren't necessarily relevant to fighting an extremist enemy. I agree. I've used the term 4GW within the framework of our discussion out of convenience, but I think the phenomena we are dealing with have yet to be adequately described and are much larger than what 4GW theorists are talking about. Over the past several years there have been many discussions of 4GW, 5GW, asymmetric war, unrestricted war, media war, idea war, meme war, etc. Not only do the Islamists present us with a different kind of threat that challenges our existing categories, but these theories allow us to review the left's success in achieving "cultural hegemony" in our universities, media, government and generally throughout our society, as well."
Phil Orenstein had written in a recent post:
>"To win the war of ideas that is central to this debate we need to put partisan politics aside and refresh ourselves with the spirit of the American Revolution and our founding fathers who fought the battle of ideas before winning the revolutionary war against the British Empire."
Beckman continues:
>"I agree that this is exactly what should happen, but it's not going to happen. We can't put partisan politics aside because the left's ideology is not only not rooted in the ideals of the American founding, but is inherently inimical to them. Remember that we live in a time where if you are a judicial candidate and you believe that the federal gov't should exercise only those powers that have been delegated by the Constitution, then you will be attacked as a right-wing extremist. Our goal should be to have the ideals and spirit of the American founding be generally accepted across all political differences. This is what we would be championing in a 4GW, media war, idea war campaign etc. But we have to accept that this is going to bring us into direct conflict with the left.
>"Around July 4th, the LA Times published an Op Ed in which the liberal writer asked, was the American Revolution really worth it? After all if we had remained part of the British Empire slavery would have been abolished in 1830 rather than 1865 and chances are we would have established the same socialist welfare state that the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have. The reality is that the left has no use for the ideals and spirit of the American Revolution.
>"The recent ISI study revealing the disastrous ignorance of American history and government shows us just how real our challenge is. We can't expect people to be inspired by the ideals of the American founding and be willing to risk their lives in defense of these ideals if they don't know what they are. This ignorance creates a population that is susceptible to the idiocies of Chomsky, Moore, et al. So promoting these ideals and educating people about them needs to be a central component of any pro-liberty, pro-American campaign.
>"While partisanship is inevitable, at the tactical level setting aside partisanship is important. For example, the Kelo decision created an opportunity to run a campaign against against eminent domain abuse and offered an opportunity to educate people on the importance of private property rights to the free society. People of all political persuasions own property and thus this kind of a campaign can appeal to everyone.
>"What we are talking about is creating a movement in which people are inspired by the ideals and a vision of the American Experiment to take action on their own, independent of any centralized control and guided by their ideals and values. The specific kinds of non-violent action available to us are many and varied. Any type of media, technology, activism, rhetorical technique and organizational form is there in the tool box. What I would like to see is a proliferation of dozens perhaps hundreds of organizations all promoting pro-liberty, pro-American ideals and working to counter the postmodernist left and Islamic fundamentalism. How do we inspire people to do this?
>"I keep coming back again and again to ideas, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and interpretations because that seems to me to be the primary battlefield. Alinsky references the well-known statement of John Adams that the revolution had taken place in the minds of the people before the war was fought. Something like that needs to happen now. This is the kind of thing that operates at a more fundamental level than electoral politics. This is about what people believe about their country and ultimately what they believe about themselves. We need to be striving to create this kind of a revolution in the minds of the people. So whether we call it 4GW, meme war, media war, culture war, whatever, I don't care, but it needs to be done."
My comment:
Phil Beckman's points are well taken. There needs to be more assertiveness and more discussion of laissez faire ideals. Individualism and the spirit of the American revolution have been attacked for ten decades by leftists, progressives and the acolytes of JP Morgan and rationalized markets, e.g., the Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party and the New York Times. Groups like ISI are critical, and I am delighted that my student Pini Bohm has started an ISI group at Brooklyn College.
Beckman continues:
>"I believe that if any generation deserves the title 'Greatest Generation' it is the founding generation. The more I learn about what they achieved the more I admire them. But we can't be constantly looking backward to them and using their words to express our beliefs. We have to drink deeply of the ideals of the American founding, make them a part of us and articulate them in our own words in a way relevant for our own time. Future generations should look back to our words and deeds and be inspired. The challenge that we face is to create a vision of where we as Americans are going together in the future. A vision of the American Experiment for the 21st century. One sign of our success will be when the American-born children of immigrants from Vietnam, Ghana, Ecuador, Korea, India, El Salvador, and Ethiopia adopt the ideals and vision of the American Experiment and root their identities there and reject the multiculturalism and cultural relativism propagated by the left. If we can't out-compete the left with people who made great efforts to become Americans then we are screwed. Our vision is what they came to pursue; the left's vision is a recipe for failure and dystopia.
>"We need to stoke the hearth-fire of liberty. If 300 million Americans are filled with and inspired by the vision of the American Experiment then the Jihadists have no chance in disrupting our society. But if half the populace ranges from ambivalence to hatred of America then we are in trouble. And it is the left that is responsible for that ambivalence-hatred."
>"In a recent post Mitchell mentions that 4GW may be passe and that many of the things that Hammes writes about aren't necessarily relevant to fighting an extremist enemy. I agree. I've used the term 4GW within the framework of our discussion out of convenience, but I think the phenomena we are dealing with have yet to be adequately described and are much larger than what 4GW theorists are talking about. Over the past several years there have been many discussions of 4GW, 5GW, asymmetric war, unrestricted war, media war, idea war, meme war, etc. Not only do the Islamists present us with a different kind of threat that challenges our existing categories, but these theories allow us to review the left's success in achieving "cultural hegemony" in our universities, media, government and generally throughout our society, as well."
Phil Orenstein had written in a recent post:
>"To win the war of ideas that is central to this debate we need to put partisan politics aside and refresh ourselves with the spirit of the American Revolution and our founding fathers who fought the battle of ideas before winning the revolutionary war against the British Empire."
Beckman continues:
>"I agree that this is exactly what should happen, but it's not going to happen. We can't put partisan politics aside because the left's ideology is not only not rooted in the ideals of the American founding, but is inherently inimical to them. Remember that we live in a time where if you are a judicial candidate and you believe that the federal gov't should exercise only those powers that have been delegated by the Constitution, then you will be attacked as a right-wing extremist. Our goal should be to have the ideals and spirit of the American founding be generally accepted across all political differences. This is what we would be championing in a 4GW, media war, idea war campaign etc. But we have to accept that this is going to bring us into direct conflict with the left.
>"Around July 4th, the LA Times published an Op Ed in which the liberal writer asked, was the American Revolution really worth it? After all if we had remained part of the British Empire slavery would have been abolished in 1830 rather than 1865 and chances are we would have established the same socialist welfare state that the UK, Canada, Australia and New Zealand have. The reality is that the left has no use for the ideals and spirit of the American Revolution.
>"The recent ISI study revealing the disastrous ignorance of American history and government shows us just how real our challenge is. We can't expect people to be inspired by the ideals of the American founding and be willing to risk their lives in defense of these ideals if they don't know what they are. This ignorance creates a population that is susceptible to the idiocies of Chomsky, Moore, et al. So promoting these ideals and educating people about them needs to be a central component of any pro-liberty, pro-American campaign.
>"While partisanship is inevitable, at the tactical level setting aside partisanship is important. For example, the Kelo decision created an opportunity to run a campaign against against eminent domain abuse and offered an opportunity to educate people on the importance of private property rights to the free society. People of all political persuasions own property and thus this kind of a campaign can appeal to everyone.
>"What we are talking about is creating a movement in which people are inspired by the ideals and a vision of the American Experiment to take action on their own, independent of any centralized control and guided by their ideals and values. The specific kinds of non-violent action available to us are many and varied. Any type of media, technology, activism, rhetorical technique and organizational form is there in the tool box. What I would like to see is a proliferation of dozens perhaps hundreds of organizations all promoting pro-liberty, pro-American ideals and working to counter the postmodernist left and Islamic fundamentalism. How do we inspire people to do this?
>"I keep coming back again and again to ideas, attitudes, beliefs, perceptions and interpretations because that seems to me to be the primary battlefield. Alinsky references the well-known statement of John Adams that the revolution had taken place in the minds of the people before the war was fought. Something like that needs to happen now. This is the kind of thing that operates at a more fundamental level than electoral politics. This is about what people believe about their country and ultimately what they believe about themselves. We need to be striving to create this kind of a revolution in the minds of the people. So whether we call it 4GW, meme war, media war, culture war, whatever, I don't care, but it needs to be done."
My comment:
Phil Beckman's points are well taken. There needs to be more assertiveness and more discussion of laissez faire ideals. Individualism and the spirit of the American revolution have been attacked for ten decades by leftists, progressives and the acolytes of JP Morgan and rationalized markets, e.g., the Rockefeller wing of the Republican Party and the New York Times. Groups like ISI are critical, and I am delighted that my student Pini Bohm has started an ISI group at Brooklyn College.
Beckman continues:
>"I believe that if any generation deserves the title 'Greatest Generation' it is the founding generation. The more I learn about what they achieved the more I admire them. But we can't be constantly looking backward to them and using their words to express our beliefs. We have to drink deeply of the ideals of the American founding, make them a part of us and articulate them in our own words in a way relevant for our own time. Future generations should look back to our words and deeds and be inspired. The challenge that we face is to create a vision of where we as Americans are going together in the future. A vision of the American Experiment for the 21st century. One sign of our success will be when the American-born children of immigrants from Vietnam, Ghana, Ecuador, Korea, India, El Salvador, and Ethiopia adopt the ideals and vision of the American Experiment and root their identities there and reject the multiculturalism and cultural relativism propagated by the left. If we can't out-compete the left with people who made great efforts to become Americans then we are screwed. Our vision is what they came to pursue; the left's vision is a recipe for failure and dystopia.
>"We need to stoke the hearth-fire of liberty. If 300 million Americans are filled with and inspired by the vision of the American Experiment then the Jihadists have no chance in disrupting our society. But if half the populace ranges from ambivalence to hatred of America then we are in trouble. And it is the left that is responsible for that ambivalence-hatred."
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